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Economics of Crime - REFERENCES

  • Akerlof, G. A., (1980), A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 94, 749-775.
  • Akiba, H., (1991), The deterrent effect reconsidered: the minimum-time approach, The Journal of Socio-Economics 20(2), 181-192.
  • Bebchuk, L. A. and L. Kaplow, (1993), Optimal sanctions and differences in individuals’ likelihood of avoiding detection, International Review of Law and Economics 13, 217-224.
  • Becker, G. S., (1968), Crime and punishment: an economic approach, Journal of Political Economy 76, 169-217.
  • Becker, G. S., (1982), Der oekonomische Ansatz zur Erklaerung menschlichen Verhaltens, Paul Siebeck, Tuebingen.
  • Brock, W. A. and S. N. Durlauf, (1995), Discrete choice with social interactions I: theory, Working Paper 95-10-084, Santa Fe Institute.
  • Cameron, S., (1988), The economics of crime deterrence: a survey of theory and evidence, Kyklos 41(2), 301-323.
  • Chu, C. Y. C., (1993), Oscillatory vs. stationary enforcement of law, International Review of Law and Economics 13(3), 303-315.
  • Davis, M. L., (1988), Time and punishment: an intertemporal model of crime, Journal of Political Economy 96(2), 383-390.
  • Falkinger, J. and H. Walther, (1991), Separating small and big fish: the case of income tax evasion, Journal of Economics 54(1), 55-67.
  • Falkinger, J. and H. Walther, (1991), Rewards versus penalties: on a new policy against tax evasion, Public Finance Quarterly 19(1), 67-79.
  • Falkinger, J., (1995), Tax evasion, consumption of public goods and fairness, Journal of Economic Psychology 16, 63-72.
  • Glaeser, E., B. Sacerdote and J. Scheinkman, (1994), Crime and social interactions, Working Paper, Harvard University and the University of Chicago.
  • Leung, S. F., (1991), How to make the fine fit the corporate crime? An analysis of static and dynamic optimal punishment theories, Journal of Public Economics 45(2), 243-256.
  • Leung, S. F., (1994), An economic analysis of the age-crime profile, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 18, 481-497.
  • Leung, S. F., (1995), Dynamic deterrence theory, Economica 62, 65-87.
  • Malik, A. S., (1990), Avoidance, screening and optimum enforcement, RAND Journal of Economics 21(3), 341-353.
  • Polinsky, A. M. and S. Shavell, (1991), A note on optimal fines when wealth varies among individuals, The American Economic Review 81(3), 618-621.
  • Polinsky, A. M. and S. Shavell, (1992), Enforcement costs and the optimal magnitude and probability of fines, Journal of Law & Economics 35(1), 133-148.
  • Schelling, T., (1973), Hockey helmets, concealed weapons, and daylight saving: a study of binary choices with externalities, Journal of Conflict Resolution 17(3), 381-428.
  • Sethi, S. P., (1979), Optimal pilfering policies for dynamic continuous thieves, Management Science 25(6), 535-542.
  • Shavell, S., (1990), Deterrence and the punishment of attempts, Journal of Legal Studies 19(2), 435-466.
  • Young, H. P., (1993), The evolution of conventions, Econometrica 61(1), 57-84. 

Own work

  • Feichtinger, G., (1974), Bemerkungen ueber stochastische Modelle der Straffaelligkeit, Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv 58(2), 198-221.
  • Feichtinger, G., (1983), A differential games solution to a model of competition between a thief and the police, Management Science 29(6), 686-699.
  • Feichtinger, G., (1995), Crime and punishment: a dynamic approach, Forschungsbericht 195, Institute for Econometrics, Operations Research and Systems Theory, University of Technology, Vienna.
  • Feichtinger, G. (1996), Optimal control of law enforcement, forthcoming in A. Kryazhimskii ed.: Stability and Control Theory: Theory, Methods and Applications, Gordon & Breach Science Publ., London.
  • Feichtinger, G., Ch. V. Forst and C. Piccardi, (1993), A nonlinear dynamical model for the dynastic cycle, Forschungsbericht 165, Institute for Econometrics, Operations Research and Systems Theory, University of Technology, Vienna.
  • Feichtinger, G., Novak, A.J. (1994), Differential game model of the dynastic cycle: 3D-canonical system with a stable limit cycle, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 80(3), 407-423.


PROJECT RELATED REFERENCES

Dynamics of Corruption

General References:

  • Andvig, J. C., (1991), The economics of corruption: a survey, Studi economici 43(1), 57-94.
  • Andvig, J. C. and K. Moene, (1990), How corruption may corrupt, J. of Economic Behaviour and Organization 13.
  • Antoci, A. and P. L. Sacco, (1995), A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption, J. of Economics 61(2), 89-122.
  • Basu, K., S. Bhattacharya and A. Mishra, (1992), Notes on bribery and the control of corruption, J. of Public Economics 48(3), 349-359.
  • Bicchieri, C. and C. Rovelli, (1995), Evolution and revolution, Rationality and Society 7(2), 201-224.
  • Lui, F. T., (1985), An equilibrium queuing model of bribery, J. of  Political Economy 93(4), 760-781.
  • Rose-Ackerman, S., (1975), The economics of corruption, J. of Public Economics 4, 187-203.
  • Rose-Ackerman, S., (1978), Corruption A Study in Political Economy, Academic Press, New York.
  • Schleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny, (1993), Corruption, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3), 599-617.
  • Strand, J., (1989), Bureaucratic corruption in government contract procurement, Department of Economics Memoranda 3, University of Oslo.
  • Tullock, G., (1965), The Politics of Bureaucracy, The Public Affairs Press, Washington.

Own Work:

  • Dawid, H., Feichtinger, G. (1996), Optimal allocation of drug control efforts: a differential game analysis. J. Optim. Theory Appl. 91, 279-297.
  • Dawid, H., Feichtinger, G. (1996), On the persistence of corruption. J. Economics 64,177-193.
  • Feichtinger, G., Wirl, F. (1994), On the stability and potential cyclicity of corruption in governments subject to popularity constraints. Math. Social Sci. 28, 113-131.
  • Rinaldi, S., Feichtinger, G., Wirl, F. (1998), Corruption Dynamics in Democratic Societies. Complexity, vol. 3, no. 5.


Control of Drug Consumption

General References:

  • Bovina, A., Batta, R., Caulkins, J.P., Karwan, M.H. (1992), Collapsing street market for illicit drugs: the benefits of being decisive, Working Paper.
  • Baveja, A., Batta, R., Caulkins, J.P., Karwan, M.H. (1993), Modeling the response of illicit drug markets to local enforcement, Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 27(2), 73-89.
  • Baveja, A., Caulkins, J.P., Liu, W., Batta, R., Karwan, M.H. (1997), When haste makes sense: cracking down on street markets for illicit drugs, Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 31(4), 293-306.
  • Becker, G. S. (1968), Crime and punishment: an economic approach, Journal of Political Economy 76, 169-217.
  • Becker, G.S., Murphy, K.M. (1988), A theory of rational addiction, Journal of Political Economy 96(4), 675-700.
  • Benson, B.L., Kim, I., Rasmussen, D.W., Zuehlke, T.W. (1992), Is property crime caused by drug use or by drug enforcement policy?, Applied Economics 24(7), 679-692.
  • Benson, B.L., Rasmussen, D.W. (1991), Relationship between illicit drug enforcement policy and property crimes, Contemporary Policy Issues 9(4), 106-115.
  • Botvin, G.J., Baker, E., Dusenbury, L., Botvin, E.M., Diaz, T. (1995), Long-term follow-up results of a randomized drug abuse prevention trial in a white middle-class population, Journal of the American Medical Association 273, 1106-1112.
  • Braun, N. (1995), The threshold model revisited, submitted to Journal of Mathematical Sociology.
  • Braun, N. (1995), Individual thresholds and social diffusion, Rationality and Society 7(2), 167-182.
  • Braun, N. (1996), Threshold model and drug policy, Working Paper, University of Bern.
  • Braun, N. (1998), Rationalitaet und Drogenproblematik, Habilitationsschrift im Fach Soziologie an der Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Bern.
  • Braun, N., Diekmann, A. (1993), Drogenschwarzmarkt und KonsumentInnensituation: Einige Ergebnisse der Berner Szenebefragung, Drogalkohol 17, 161-182.
  • Brito, D.L., Intriligator, M.D. (1992), Narco-traffic and guerrilla warfare: a new symbiosis, Defence Economics 3(4), 263-274.
  • Caulkins, J.P. (1990), The distribution and consumption of illicit drugs: some mathematical models and their policy implications, Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge.
  • Caulkins, J.P. (1993), Local drug markets' response to focused police enforcement, Operations Research 41(5), 848-863.
  • Caulkins, J.P. (1993), Zero-tolerance policies: do they inhibit or stimulate illicit drug consumption?, Management Science 39(4), 458-476.
  • Caulkins, J.P. (1993), Preface: mathematical models of drug markets and drug policy, Mathematical and Computer Modelling 17(2), ix-xi.
  • Caulkins, J.P. (1995), Dealing with the country’s drug problem, OR/MS Today, February, 32-40.
  • Caulkins, J.P., Rydell, C.P., Everingham, S.S., Chiesa, J., Bushway, S. (1999), The Cost-Effectiveness of School-Based Drug Prevention Programs (RAND, Santa Monica).
  • Caulkins, J.P., Rydell, C.P., Schwabe, W.L., Chiesa, J. (1997), Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences: Throwing Away the Key or the Taxpayer's Money? (RAND, Santa Monica).
  • Childress, M. (1994), A System Description of the Heroin Trade (RAND, Santa Monica).
  • Childress, M. (1994), A System Description of the Marijuana Trade (RAND, Santa Monica).
  • Dombey-Moore, B., Resetar, S. (1994), A Systems Description of the Cocaine Trade (RAND, Santa Monica).
  • Ellickson, P.L., Bell, R.M. (1990), Drug prevention in Junior High: a multi-site longitudinal test, Science 247(March), 1299-1305.
  • European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (1998), Drug Use Research, Policy and Dynamic Modelling, Seminar (EMCDDA, Lisbon, 7-9 May 1998).
  • Everingham, S.S., Rydell, C.P. (1994), Modeling the Demand of Cocaine, Research Report MR-332-ONDCP/A/DPRC (RAND, Santa Monica).
  • Everingham, S.S., Rydell, C.P., Caulkins, J.P. (1996), Cocaine consumption in the U.S.: estimating past trends and future scenarios, Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 29(4), 305-314.
  • Gardiner, L.K., Schreckengost, R.C. (1987), A system dynamics model for estimating heroin imports into the United States, System Dynamics Review 3(1), Winter, 8-27.
  • Homer, J. B. (1993), Projecting the impact of law enforcement on cocaine prevalence: a system dynamics approach, The Journal of Drug Issues 23(2), Spring, 281-295.
  • Kleiman, M.A.R. (1988), Crackdowns: the effects of intensive enforcement on retail heroin dealing, in Chaiken, M.R. (ed.), Street-level Drug Enforcement: Examining the Issues (Natural Institute of Justice, Washington).
  • Kleiman, M.A.R. (1993), Enforcement swamping: a positive-feedback mechanism in rates of illicit activity, Mathematical and Computer Modelling 17(2), 65-75.
  • Levin, G., Roberts, E.B., Hirsch, G.B. (1975), The Persistent Poppy: A Computer-Aided Search for Heroin Policy (Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge).
  • Musto, D.F. (1987), The American Disease (Yale University Press, New Haven).
  • National Institute on Drug Abuse (1991), Overview of the 1991 National Household Survey of Drug Abuse, press release, December.
  • Rasmussen, D.W., Benson, B.L., Sollars, D.L. (1993), Spatial competition in illicit drug markets: the consequences of increased drug law enforcement, Review of Regional Studies 23(3), 219-236.
  • Rydell, C.P., Everingham, S.S. (1994), Controlling Cocaine: Supply vs. Demand Programs, Research Report MR-331-ONDCP/A/DPRC (RAND, Santa Monica).
  • Rydell, C.P., Caulkins, J.P., Everingham, S.S. (1996), Enforcement or treatment? Modeling the relative efficacy of alternatives for controlling cocaine, Operations Research 44(6), 687-695.
  • Schlenger, W.E. (1973), A systems approach to drug user services, Behavioral Science 18(2), 137-147.
  • Sollars, D.L., Benson, B.L., Rasmussen, D.W. (1994), Drug enforcement and the deterrence of property crime among local jurisdictions, Public Finance Quarterly 22(1), 22-45.
  • Stares, P.B. (1996), Global Habit: The Drug Problem in a Borderless World (Brookings Institute, Washington D.C.).
  • Thornton, M. (1991), Economists on illegal drugs: a survey of the profession, Atlantic Economic Journal 19(2), 73.
  • United Nations International Drug Control Programme (1997), World Drug Report (Oxford University Press, Oxford).

Own Work:

  • Almeder, C., Feichtinger, G., Tragler, G. (2000), An age-specific light and heavy user model for illicit drug consumption, Draft for a working paper, Vienna University of Technology.
  • Baveja, A., Feichtinger, G., Hartl, R.F., Haunschmied, J.L., Kort, P.M. (1999), Optimal crackdown on an illicit drug market under a budget constraint, Working Paper.
  • Behrens, D. A., J. P. Caulkins, G. Tragler and G. Feichtinger (1997), Controlling the U.S. cocaine epidemic: prevention from light vs. treatment of heavy use, Working Paper 214, Department for Operations Research and Systems Theory, Vienna University of Technology. - click here to get article as PDF-file
  • Behrens, D.A., Caulkins, J.P., Tragler, G., Haunschmied, J.L., Feichtinger, G. (1999), A dynamic model of drug initiation: implications for treatment and drug control”, Mathematical Biosciences 159, 1-20.
  • Behrens, D.A., Caulkins, J.P., Tragler, G., Feichtinger, G. (2000), Optimal Control of Drug Epidemics: Prevent and Treat – But Not at the Same Time?, Management Science 46(3), 333-347.
  • Borisov, V., Feichtinger, G., Kryazhimskii, A. (1999), Optimal enforcement on a pure seller’s market of illicit drugs, Working Paper, University of Moscow.
  • Caulkins, J.P., Dworak, M., Feichtinger, G., Tragler, G. (1998), Price-Raising Drug Enforcement and Property Crime: A Dynamic Model, Journal of Economics 71(3).
  • Dawid, H., Feichtinger, G. (1996), Optimal allocation of drug control efforts: a differential game analysis, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 91, 279-297.
  • Dockner, E.J., Feichtinger, G. (1993), Cyclical consumption patterns and rational addiction, The American Economic Review 83(1), 256-263.
  • Dworak, M., G. Feichtinger, G. Tragler and J. P. Caulkins (1998), On the effect of drug enforcement on property crime, Working Paper 215, Department for Operations Research and Systems Theory, Vienna University of Technology. - click here to get article as PDF-file
  • Feichtinger, G. and R. F. Hartl (1986), Optimale Kontrolle oekonomischer Prozesse - Anwendungen des Maximumprinzips in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin.
  • Feichtinger, G. (1992), Rational addictive cycles (‘binges’) under a budget constraint, Optimal Control Applications & Methods 13, 95-104.
  • Feichtinger, G., Hommes, C.H., Milik, A. (1995), Chaotic consumption patterns in a simple 2-d addiction model, Economic Theory, forthcoming.
  • Gragnani, A., Feichtinger, G., Rinaldi, S. (1994), Dynamics of drug consumption: a theoretical model, Working Paper 94-77, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.
  • Gragnani, A., Rinaldi, S., Feichtinger, G. (1995), Slow-fast limit cycles in controlled drug markets, Forschungsbericht 187, Institute for Econometrics, Operations Research and Systems Theory, University of Technology, Vienna.
  • Gragnani, A., Rinaldi, S., Feichtinger, G. (1997), Dynamics of drug consumption: a theoretical model, Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 31(2), 127-137.
  • Kort, P.M., Feichtinger, G., Hartl, R.F., Haunschmied, J.L. (1998), Optimal enforcement policies (crackdowns) on an illicit drug market, Optimal Control Applications and Methods 19, 169-184.
  • Popovic, N., T. Ribarits and G. Tragler (1998), On drug enforcement and property crime: an incapacitation model, Working Paper 218, Department for Operations Research and Systems Theory, Vienna University of Technology.
  • Tragler, G., J. P. Caulkins and G. Feichtinger (1997), The impact of enforcement and treatment on illicit drug consumption, Working Paper 212, Department for Operations Research and Systems Theory, Vienna University of Technology. - click here to get article as PDF-file
  • Tragler, G., Caulkins, J.P., Feichtinger, G. (forthcoming), Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Treatment and Enforcement in Illicit Drug Control, Operations Research.
  • Wirl, F., Feichtinger, G. (1995), Persistent cyclical consumption - variations on the Becker-Murphy model of addiction, Rationality and Society 7(2), 156-166.


Age-specific Control Models

General References:

  • Arthur, W.B. and G. McNicoll, (1977), Optimal time paths with age-dependence: a theory of population policy, Review of Economic Studies 44, 111-123.
  • Ascher, U., J. Christiansen and R. D. Russell, (1978), A collocation solver for mixed-order systems of boundary-value problems, Mathematics of Computation 33, 659-679.
  • Bensoussan, A., G., Nissen and C.S. Tapiero, (1975), Optimum inventory and product quality control with deterministic and stochastic deterioration - an application of distributed parame­ters control systems, IEEE Trans. Autom. Contr. AAC-20, 407-412.
  • Brokate, M., (1985), Pontryagin's principle for control problems in age-dependent population dynamics, Journal of Mathematical Biology 23, 75-101.
  • Butkovsky, A.G., (1969), Distributed control systems. American Elsevier Publ., New York.
  • Derzko, N.A., S.P. Sethi and G.L. Thompson, (1980), Distributed parameter systems approach to the optimal cattle ranching problem, Optimal Control Applications and Methods 1, 3-10.
  • Derzko, N.A., S.P. Sethi and G.L. Thompson, (1984), Necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal control of quasilinear partial differential systems, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 43, 89-101.
  • Gaimon, C. and G.L. Thompson, (1981), A distributed parameter cohort personnel planning model, Working paper 43-80-81, Carnegie-Mellon Univ. Pittsburgh.
  • Gopalsamy, K., (1976), Optimal control of age-dependent populations, Mathematical Bio­science 32, 155-163.
  • Gurtin, M.E. and L.F. Murphy, (1981), On the optimal harvesting of persistent age-structured populations, Journal of Mathematical Biology 13, 131-148.
  • Leonard, D. and N. V. Long, (1992), Optimal control theory and static optimization in economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
  • Murphy, L.F. and S.J. Smith, (1990), Optimal harvesting of an age-structured population, Journal of Mathematical Biology 29, 77-90.
  • Robson, A.J., (1985), Optimal control of systems governed by partial differential equations: economic applications, In: G. Feichtinger (Ed.) Optimal Control Theory and Economic Analysis 2, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 105-118.
  • Steindl, A., (1981), COLSYS: Ein Kollokationsverfahren zur Loesung von Randwertproblemen bei Systemen Gewoehnlicher Differentialgleichungen. Thesis, University of Technology, Vienna.
  • Tzafestas, S.G., (1982), Optimal and modal control of production-inventory systems, In S.G. Tzafestas (Ed.) Optimization and Control of Dynamic Operational Research Models, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1-71.

Own Work:

  • Behrens, D. A., J. P. Caulkins, G. Tragler and G. Feichtinger, (1997), Controlling the US cocaine epidemic: finding the optimal mix of drug prevention and treatment. Working Paper 214, Department for Operations Research and Systems Theory, Vienna University of Tech­nology. Forthcoming in Management Science.
  • Behrens, D. A., J. P. Caulkins, G. Tragler, J. L. Haunschmied and G. Feichtinger, (1999), A dynamic model of drug initiation: implications for treatment and drug control. Mathematical Biosciences 159, 1-20.
  • Dawid, H. and Feichtinger, (1996), On the persistence of corruption. Journal of Economics 64, 177-193.
  • Dworak, M., G. Feichtinger, G. Tragler and J. P. Caulkins, (1998), On the effect of drug enforcement on property crime. Working Paper 215, Department for Operations Research and Systems Theory, Vienna University of Technology. Forthcoming in Journal of Economics.
  • Feichtinger, G., (1992), Limit cycles in dynamic economic systems. Annals of Operations Research 37, 313-344.
  • Feichtinger, G. and R.F. Hartl, (1986), Optimale Kontrolle oekonomischer Prozesse: Anwendungen des Maximumprinzips in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften. de Gruyter, Berlin.
  • Feichtinger, G. and A. J. Novak, (1994), Differential game model of the dynastic cycle: 3D-canonical system with a stable limit cycle. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 80, 407-423.
  • Feichtinger, G., A. Novak and F. Wirl, (1994), Limit cycles in intertemporal adjustment models. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 18, 353-380.
  • Haurie, A., S.P. Sethi and R.F. Hartl, (1984), Optimal control of an age-structured population model with applications to social services planning. Large Scale Systems 6, 133-158.
  • Maurer, H., Ch. Büskens and G. Feichtinger, (1998), Solution techniques for periodic control problems: a case study in production planning. Optimal Control Applications and Methods 19, 185-203.
  • Muzicant, J., (1980), Systeme mit verteilten Parametern in der Biooekonomie: Ein Maximumprinzip zur Kontrolle altersstruktuierter Modelle. Diss., Technische Universitaet Wien.
  • Tragler, G., J. P. Caulkins and G. Feichtinger, (1997), The impact of enforcement and treatment on illicit drug consumption. Working Paper 212, Department for Operations Research and Systems Theory, Vienna University of Technology. Forthcoming in Operations Research.
  • Wirl, F., A. Novak, G. Feichtinger and H. Dawid, (1997), Indeterminacy of open-loop Nash equilibria: the ruling class versus the tabloid press. In H. G. Natke and Y. Ben-Haim, Uncertainty: Models and Measures. Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 124-136.


DNS Thresholds

General References:

  • Becker, G. S. (1968), Crime and punishment: an economic approach, Journal of Political Economy 76, 169-217.
  • Dechert, W.D. and K. Nishimura (1983), A complete characterization of optimal growth in an aggregated model with a non-concave production function. J. Econom. Th. 31(2), 332-354.
  • Gould, J.P. (1970), Diffusion process and optimal advertising policy. In: E.S. Phelps et al. (eds.),Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Inflation Theory. Macmillan, London, 338-368.
  • Long, N.V., K. Nishimura and K. Shimomura (1997), Endogenous growth, trade, and specialization under variable returns to scale: the case of a small open economy. In Jensen, B. wong, K. (Ed.): Dynamics, Economic Growth and International Trade. Michigan University Press
  • Skiba, A.K. (1978), Optimal growth with a convex-concave production function. Econometrica 46(3), 527-539.

Own Work:

  • Caulkins, J.P., Dworak, M., Feichtinger, G., Tragler, G. (1998), Price-Raising Drug Enforcement and Property Crime: A Dynamic Model, Journal of Economics 71(3).
  • Feichtinger, G. and R.F. Hartl, (1986), Optimale Kontrolle oekonomischer Prozesse: Anwendungen des Maximumprinzips in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften. de Gruyter, Berlin.
  • Feichtinger, G., W. Grienauer and G. Tragler (1997), Optimal dynamic law enforcement. Submitted to European Journal of Operations Research.
  • Feichtinger, G. (1999), Environmental policy design and the economics of crime: some analogies in intertemporal optimization. Forschungsbericht 231 des Instituts für Oekonometrie, OR und Systemtheorie, TU Wien.
  • Tragler, G., J. P. Caulkins and G. Feichtinger, (1997), The impact of enforcement and treatment on illicit drug consumption. Working Paper 212, Department for Operations Research and Systems Theory, Vienna University of Technology. Forthcoming in Operations Research.  
  • Wirl, F. and G. Feichtinger (1999), History Dependence in Concave Economics. Working Paper.