Forschungsgruppe ORCOS
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Dynamics of Corruption

General References:

  • Andvig, J. C., (1991), The economics of corruption: a survey, Studi economici 43(1), 57-94.
  • Andvig, J. C. and K. Moene, (1990), How corruption may corrupt, J. of Economic Behaviour and Organization 13.
  • Antoci, A. and P. L. Sacco, (1995), A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption, J. of Economics 61(2), 89-122.
  • Basu, K., S. Bhattacharya and A. Mishra, (1992), Notes on bribery and the control of corruption, J. of Public Economics 48(3), 349-359.
  • Bicchieri, C. and C. Rovelli, (1995), Evolution and revolution, Rationality and Society 7(2), 201-224.
  • Lui, F. T., (1985), An equilibrium queuing model of bribery, J. of  Political Economy 93(4), 760-781.
  • Rose-Ackerman, S., (1975), The economics of corruption, J. of Public Economics 4, 187-203.
  • Rose-Ackerman, S., (1978), Corruption A Study in Political Economy, Academic Press, New York.
  • Schleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny, (1993), Corruption, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3), 599-617.
  • Strand, J., (1989), Bureaucratic corruption in government contract procurement, Department of Economics Memoranda 3, University of Oslo.
  • Tullock, G., (1965), The Politics of Bureaucracy, The Public Affairs Press, Washington.

Own Work:

  • Dawid, H., Feichtinger, G. (1996), Optimal allocation of drug control efforts: a differential game analysis. J. Optim. Theory Appl. 91, 279-297.
  • Dawid, H., Feichtinger, G. (1996), On the persistence of corruption. J. Economics 64,177-193.
  • Feichtinger, G., Wirl, F. (1994), On the stability and potential cyclicity of corruption in governments subject to popularity constraints. Math. Social Sci. 28, 113-131.
  • Rinaldi, S., Feichtinger, G., Wirl, F. (1998), Corruption Dynamics in Democratic Societies. Complexity, vol. 3, no. 5.